The Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), central to the Stability and Growth Pact, is criticized for both its procyclical effects and -in contrast -a perceived lack of enforcement. To test its actual effects, we construct a real-time database of EDP recommendations and estimate augmented real-time and ex-post fiscal reaction functions for a panel of EMU member states. We find that a 1% of GDP larger EDP recommendation leads to close to 1% of GDP of additional fiscal consolidation plans, and around 0.8% of actual consolidation. For countries in financial support programs we find that, while they did implement substantial consolidation measures, required and delivered consolidation efforts are less connected. Overall, our results suggest that EDP recommendations have substantially shaped euro area fiscal policy, especially in the years 2010-2014, when EDP recommendations were both largest and most frequent. and n.d.gilbert@dnb.nl. 1 The 60%-threshold for government debt effectively was irrelevant before the 2011 reform. Even after this reform, the main focus has been on adherence to budget balance rules. See De Haan et al. (2016). 2 For example, despite deficits surging to levels well beyond 3% of GDP in 2009 in many European countries, most of them were invited to provide fiscal stimulus in 2009/10 and were not required to consolidate before 2011. 3 See e.g. Hughes Hallett and Lewis (2008), Ioannou and Stracca (2014) and Caselli and Wingender (2018).
Introduction
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) combines centralized monetary policy with fiscal policy at the national level. With monetary policy responding only weakly to the economic circumstances in individual countries, it was recognized early on that this could incentivize countries to run overly expansionary fiscal policies (see EC, 1990 ). Furthermore, it was suspected that the counterforce against unsustainable fiscal policy provided by market forces "might either be too slow and weak or too sudden and disruptive" (Delors, 1989) . For these reasons, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 introduced supranational fiscal rules in the form of the (in)famous 3% and 60% thresholds for the budget deficit and the debt, respectively.
European fiscal rules were operationalized in 1997 in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
As the concerns regarding market discipline proving prescient (Buti and Carnot, 2012; De Grauwe and Ji, 2012) , the importance given to EMU's supranational fiscal rules only increased over time.
Notwithstanding amendments to the SGP in 2005 and 2011, the 3%-threshold for the government budget deficit has played a pivotal role throughout. 1 In short, countries whose budget deficit exceeds or is projected to exceed 3% of GDP end up in the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), where they receive binding recommendations on the annual fiscal adjustments to be undertaken. Countries failing to live up to these recommendations can, eventually, be fined.
The SGP, in particular the 3%-rule and its focus on cutting back high deficits rapidly, has been criticized from opposite ends. Some view the SGP and its EDP recommendations as an unwelcome restriction, limiting the scope for fiscal stabilization at the national level (e.g. Buiter et al., 1993; Bofinger, 2003; Truger, 2013) . Others, however, question whether the SGP and its procedures have any actual disciplining power, as deadlines for reducing deficits below 3% of GDP are regularly missed and fines have never been imposed (Schuknecht et al., 2011) .
Remarkably, the effect of EDP recommendations on the fiscal behavior of EMU member states has never been analyzed in a direct manner. Some authors use the 3% threshold to define the applicable fiscal governance regime, generally finding that at least forecasted deficits fall faster when this threshold is exceeded Cimadomo, 2012; Frankel and Schreger, 2013) . However, this does not do justice to the fact that EDP recommendations vary in size and timing between countries, depending on e.g. economic circumstances. 2 Other papers infer the effectiveness of European fiscal rules from a comparison of fiscal policy before and after the introduction of the SGP, or between countries in-and outside the euro area. 3
These approaches are also not without complications. The introduction of the SGP was not a standalone event and the run-up to EMU hardly qualifies as neutral benchmark, given that it was characterized by a fiscal push to meet the convergence criteria.
In this paper we take a different route and directly analyze the impact of EDP recommendations on forecasted and actual fiscal policy. On the basis of a simple model of government fines are possible. However, all EU member states (except for the United Kingdom) potentially face a temporary suspension of assistance from the Cohesion Fund in case of non-compliance.
The SGP has been reformed multiple times since its inception. In 2005 the Pact was changed to enhance the economic rationale underlying the fiscal rules and improve their flexibility (Andrle et al., 2015) . A more fundamental revision took place in 2011, in response to the debt crisis in the euro area. Among other things, the debt criterion was operationalized, 7 voting rules on 4 Treaty establishing the European Community, article 104c -5. 5 An excessive deficit can also be identified based on the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 60% -unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace. However, prior to the 2011 reforms the debt criterion was not operationalized and effectively played no role in European fiscal governance. 6 If a Member State is judged to have taken effective action, but misses the deadline due to unexpected adverse economic events, the deadline may be extended (EC, 2018) . 7 Countries with debts exceeding 60% of GDP are supposed to bring down their debt by 1/20th of the excess over 4 sanctions were changed to increase the likelihood of sanctions actually being imposed if need be, and fiscal rules for countries with deficits below 3% of GDP were strengthened. Finally, in 2013 the 'two-pack' and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG, often referred to as 'fiscal compact', signed by 25 countries) entered into force. Amongst others, it was prescribed that countries should establish independent fiscal councils at the national level and, underlying their fiscal forecasts, should use macroeconomic forecasts produced or endorsed by an independent body. Despite all these changes, the centrality of the 3%-threshold and the importance of the EDP procedure has remained intact.
Council recommendations and fiscal behavior
Supranational fiscal rules, such as those laid down in the SGP, aim to restrict the policy freedom of national governments. As such, they alter incentives faced by policy makers and likely affect fiscal behavior of incumbent governments. This behavioral response can take several forms, as argued by Alt et al. (2014) . Most notably, fiscal rules may alter actual fiscal policy (e.g., Bénétrix and Lane, 2013) , but also give rise to biasing fiscal forecasts (Frankel and Schreger, 2013) or, concerning realization data, to resort to creative accounting (Milesi-Ferretti, 2004) .
To structure thinking about the ways in which EDP recommendations might impact government behavior, we introduce a simple model for euro area member states. 8 Our point of departure is a world without external fiscal rules. In such a setting, a government would follow its preferred fiscal policy path, balancing objectives like fiscal sustainability, macroeconomic stabilization and other political goals. As fiscal rules by definition impose limits on national policy making, we model the government's behavior in the face of these rules as a loss function. 9 We identify three potential sources of utility loss for a government receiving an EDP recommendation. To the extent that EDP recommendations demand a more restrictive fiscal policy than preferred, implementing the required consolidation measures is politically costly. A government could therefore decide to provide less effort than required, thereby risking sanctions.
An alternative way to refrain from implementing the full amount of consolidation would be to suggest that consolidation measures are implemented, while in reality they are not. It is likely, however, that misreporting data or biasing forecasts, once discovered, does not go without costs.
Based on the above, we postulate the following illustrative loss function for the government:
with ∆BBS denoting actual fiscal adjustment, ∆BBS * the preferred fiscal adjustment in a world without supranational fiscal rules, p the probability of getting sanctioned by the fixed 60% of GDP each year. 8 The SGP applies to all EU member states, but incentives for EMU member states differ from those for non member states. Forced deposits or fines do not apply to non member states. In contrast, countries aiming to join EMU have strong incentives to comply: not living up to the rules could mean that accession is delayed. 9 Of course, countries voluntarily signed up for the supranational rules. Restraint on the fiscal behavior of other eurozone member states could bring them benefits, e.g. in the form of reduced risk of bail-outs. Given other governments' behavior, it could however well be optimal for the individual government not to follow the rules. amount S, and ∆BBS r the reported fiscal adjustment. The probability of being sanctioned p depends non-linearly on the reported adjustment:
with γ ≥ 0, REC > c ≥ 0 and REC denoting the EDP recommendation.
The first term on the right hand side in equation 1 indicates the utility loss for the government from deviating from its preferred fiscal policy. We assume that this loss more than proportionally increases in the size of the deviation from the baseline.
The second term denotes the expected value of the sanction resulting from non-compliance, which is the product of the probability of sanctioning p and the fixed sanction S. 10 We assume p to be zero for deviations of reported fiscal adjustment from the imposed target smaller than c, and to increase continuously in the size of the deviation thereafter. As the structural budget balance is non-observable and, even ex post, measured with great uncertainty (Tereanu et al., 2014) , it is likely that small deviations of measured fiscal adjustments from recommended adjustments will go unpunished. 11 The historical hesitance of ministers of finance in the Council to punish each other, also makes it unlikely that sanctions will be imposed for minor violations. Finally, we assume that a country will always be sanctioned if it engages in expansionary fiscal policy while fiscal tightening was demanded.
The third term represents the reputational costs of misrepresenting fiscal figures by submitting deliberately overoptimistic fiscal plans to the EC. While small biases may easily go undiscovered, evident cases of fraud may tarnish reputations for years. In practice, this function can be expected to be asymmetric: positive biases likely raise more suspicion than negative biases. As in our set-up a government has no incentive to under-report fiscal figures, we abstract from this asymmetry. Figure 1 depicts the loss minimizing response for a government to an EDP recommendation. 12
If the adjustment demanded by the EC happens to be less than or in line with the government's desired fiscal stance, the recommendation will be carried out in full or even more, but the marginal adjustment induced by the recommendation is zero. Furthermore, the government will not engage in misreporting of data, as this brings potential reputational costs and no benefits.
The more interesting case occurs when the required adjustment exceeds the government's preferred adjustment. At first, a small recommendation will not invoke any reaction, since the government realizes it will not be punished for deviations smaller than c. But once government effort is sparked, the marginal response is relatively strong. At this stage, minor increases in 10 While actual sanctions in the SGP have both a fixed and a variable component, what matters for our analysis is that they have a fixed maximum (0.5% of GDP). 11 A rationale for the constant term is provided in the description of the monitoring of adherence to the preventive arm of the SGP (see EC, 2018) . In the preventive arm, a country is formally allowed to deviate from the targeted change in the structural balance by 0.25% of GDP in two consecutive years or 0.5% of GDP in a single year. 12 For an analytical derivation of the results, see Appendix A.1. (reported) fiscal adjustment give large reductions in the probability of being sanctioned, while the pain of deviating from the preferred fiscal policy stance is still limited. As the recommended adjustment increases, the gains from additional consolidation in terms of reducing the probability of being sanctioned decrease. The pain of deviating from the preferred fiscal policy stance, on the other hand, increases. As a result, the marginal impact of EDP recommendations on fiscal adjustment declines.
Expressing reported and actual fiscal adjustment as a fraction of recommended fiscal adjustment, it follows that for a broad choice of parameters compliance will be between 0 and 100% (figure 1). This holds for reported as well as delivered fiscal adjustment. The impact of EDP recommendations on fiscal adjustment is largest for 'medium-sized' recommendations. Furthermore, the degree to which the recommendation is lived up to, increases in the probability of getting sanctioned and the size of the penalty, and decreases the more politically costly it is to deliver consolidation efforts (not shown).
From our model, conditional on the regular determinants of fiscal policy, we derive the following set of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. EDP recommendations will induce countries to adjust fiscal policy. The recommendations will not be fully lived up to, however.
Hypothesis 2. EDP recommendations will induce countries to forecast a larger fiscal adjustment than eventually delivered.
Hypothesis 3. The fraction of required fiscal adjustment that is actually (reported to be) delivered, is largest for 'medium-sized' recommendations.
Related literature
The restrictions placed on national fiscal policy by the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP sparked a significant theoretical literature. Initial discussions mainly centered around the need for restrictions on national fiscal policy in a monetary union, amongst others debating the likelihood that a common central bank would come under pressure to bail out an insolvent government, and the specific form they had been given in the European case, for example discussing the constraints these rules imposed on countercyclical policy (see e.g. Buiter et al., 1993; Von Hagen and Eichengreen, 1996; Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999) .
With the SGP in place, the discussion shifted to the behavioral effects induced by the 3% threshold. Milesi-Ferretti (2004) derives theoretically that fiscal rules such as those laid down in the SGP, can provide governments with an incentive to resort to creative accounting.
Von Hagen and Wolff (2006) show empirically that governments in the EU indeed tend to classify fiscal measures and data in such a way that they help in adhering to the imposed rules. Alt et al. (2014) show that the extent to which European governments resort to creative accounting depends on the degree of transparency in the domestic budget process.
It is also well-documented that the SGP could provide governments with an incentive to bias fiscal forecasts, due to its (partial) focus on ex-ante compliance. focus on the implementation of multi-year fiscal plans in the EU and show that implemented fiscal adjustment indeed falls systematically short of governments' stated objective. Merola and Pérez (2013) show, based on a pre-crisis sample, that average forecast errors are larger for countries that have ever been under an EDP than for those that haven't. Frankel and Schreger (2013) find that governments with a budget deficit exceeding 3% of GDP often falsely forecast a rapid deficit reduction. Gilbert and De Jong (2017) show that fiscal forecasts by the EC are more optimistic when fiscal rules threaten to bind. They suspect this might be due to a nationally-induced bias, usurped by the EC given its dependence on information supplied by nationals.
A related literature surveys the effects of the SGP on actual fiscal policy in the EU or the euro area, often comparing pre-and post EMU fiscal outcomes. Mink and De Haan (2006) highlight how the SGP has failed to impede political business cycles in the euro area. Hughes Hallett and Lewis (2008) find that fiscal discipline improved in the run-up to EMU, but deteriorated in the period thereafter. In a comprehensive study, Fatás and Mihov (2010) conclude that fiscal policy in the euro area has not been very different from that observed in other countries. The introduction of the euro also did not spark significant changes. Bénétrix and Lane (2013) show that following the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 euro area fiscal policy became more countercyclical, but that this improvement was largely reversed after countries had actually joined EMU. Ioannou and Stracca (2014) evaluate the effectiveness of both the SGP and the Lisbon strategy by comparing macroeconomic outcomes before and after their application, as well as by comparing EU outcomes against those of a non-EU control group. They conclude that neither has had a beneficial impact. Caselli and Wingender (2018) , applying bunching estimation, find that the 3% threshold acts as a 'magnet', increasing the number of observations around the threshold, while significantly reducing the occurrence of large budget deficits.
An important caveat with this literature is that it uses ex post data, which have often been revised significantly and might therefore lead to incorrect inference about policymaking (Croushore, 2011) . Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) are the first authors to employ a quasi real-time set-up, combining realization data for the change in the cyclically adjusted budget balance with real-time output gap data. The authors approximate required fiscal adjustment using the difference between the actual deficit and the 3% threshold. They show that this variable effectively captures the behavior of countries with excessive deficits. The reaction to past debt and budget balance levels does not change significantly pre and post EMU, and the authors also do not find evidence for a procyclical bias resulting from the SGP. and Cimadomo (2012) are among the first fully real-time studies of euro area fiscal policy making. 13 Both papers estimate fiscal reaction functions for OECD countries, finding that while fiscal plans are countercyclical, this is less clear for fiscal outcomes. 
Data description and empirical approach
We combine a hand-collected database of the Council's fiscal recommendations with a real-time database of the European Commission's fiscal and economic forecasts. Throughout the remainder of this paper, the following notation will be used: 
Fiscal forecasts and realizations
We analyze fiscal forecasts by the EC. These forecasts serve as the baseline against which EDP recommendations are set and, in a later stage, are used to judge compliance. As such, they offer the only forecasts that are fully consistent with the EDP recommendations. Autumn Forecasts are usually published in November. They contain forecasts up to two years ahead, as well as realization data up to four years back. As fiscal plans for next year in many cases have been approved by the time of publication of the Autumn Forecast, the one year ahead fiscal forecasts do take fiscal plans into account. However, this is not always the case. If plans are not approved before the Autumn Forecast cut-off date, the Spring Forecast for the current year will be the first forecast vintage to fully incorporate fiscal plans.
In our baseline analysis, we focus on one-year ahead and current year forecasts from the Spring and Autumn Forecasts. These are the most interesting vintages from a policy making perspective, as they show the evolvement from no-policy (or at least little policy) to full-policy forecasts and they provide the relevant figures with respect to the monitoring of SGP-rules.
Furthermore, we take aboard the first vintages of 'realization' data from the published forecasts,
i.e. the year t + 1 Spring and Autumn Forecasts for year t. The first of these vintages offers the first ex-post estimate of whether a country has complied with the recommendations, and is also used by the EC for those purposes. However, the very fact that this number is used to judge compliance, means that incentives could exist for countries to present overoptimistic fiscal data.
The Autumn Forecast realization figures are the first figures that have been published in the National Accounts and should suffer less from this problem.
Apart from EDP recommendations, which will be discussed in the next section, we also use other data. Data on long-term government interest rates are obtained from the European Central Bank (ECB). 16 We use these to calculate interest spreads vis-à-vis German bonds, arguably the safest asset in the euro area. 17 Budget semi-elasticities, used to translate fiscal adjustment defined as changes in the actual budget balance into changes in the structural budget balance, are taken from Girouard and André (2005) and EC (2009). A matrix of trade weights for the EU is obtained from the ECB's Statistical Data Warehouse. 18 We use these in constructing our instruments for the output gap. Data on planned elections, i.e. elections that take place after an incumbent government has completed its term, come from the Döring and Manow (2018) database. 
Database of EDP recommendations
Countries subject to an EDP are required to take corrective action. On a proposal from the EC, the Council lays out the size of the fiscal adjustment to be delivered in so-called 'recommendations'. All recommendations are published on the EC's website.
Recommendations can be issued, and revised, throughout the year, though most of the recommendations are issued following either the Spring or Autumn Forecast. We include all recommendations, and updates thereof, in a single database, which we then make consistent with the timing of our real-time fiscal database. That is, we only consider a recommendation relevant to a forecast if the recommendation was adopted by the Council before the forecast date. For example, if the EC in June of year t − 1 (that is, after publication of the Spring Forecast) recommends country i to improve its structural budget balance by 1% of GDP in year t, this recommendation is taken into account from the Autumn Forecast of year t − 1 onwards.
In most recommendations, fiscal adjustment is defined in terms of the required improvement in the cyclically-adjusted or, more recently, structural budget balance. 19 However, in a small number of cases, relating to Greece and Cyprus during the crisis years, targets for the nominal budget balance were provided. In order to express nominal budget balance targets into changes in the structural budget balance, we apply the following simple formula:
where REC i,t is the derived EDP recommendation for the change in the structural budget balance, BB REC i,t is the recommended target for the nominal budget balance; i,t is the country's budget semi-elasticity, measuring the response of the nominal budget balance to a change in the output gap; and OG i,t is the output gap. We thus correct the implied recommended change in the nominal budget balance for year t for the expected change in the output gap. This leaves us with changes in the cyclically adjusted budget. 20 In as far as possible, we use the projected change of the output gap at the time the recommendation was issued. 21
The first EDPs were opened in 2003, for France and Germany. Up to 2017, 22 EDPs have been launched for EMU member states. As within an EDP fiscal recommendations can be revised and the adjustment period prolonged, in total 46 (revised) multi-annual recommendations were put in place. These 46 recommendations encompassed 88 targets for individual country-year combinations. As figure 2 shows, the average required fiscal adjustment in the EMU as a whole peaked during the crisis years, reaching almost 1% of GDP in 2012. Most recommendations require annual fiscal adjustment of 0.5-1% of GDP ( figure 3 ). Required adjustments larger than 2% of GDP are scarce. In one case, a recommendation was revised to be slightly larger than 3% of GDP, in four cases the recommended adjustment was negative. These recommendations all relate to countries receiving financial support: in some cases the structural budget balance deteriorated so rapidly (due to, amongst others, revisions to potential output) that limiting the deterioration (i.e. negative effort) was a challenge in itself.
Empirical approach
The starting point of our analysis is a real-time, but otherwise standard fiscal reaction function.
Our dependent variable is the projected or actual change in the structural budget balance, as this is the measure of fiscal adjustment used by the EC. As independent variables we include variables capturing cyclical conditions, government solvency, and the political business cycle.
These variables have been found to drive discretionary fiscal policy by amongst others Mink and De Haan (2006), and Cimadomo (2012) and aim to capture the government's desired fiscal stance (BBS * in the model presented in 2.2). We then include real-time EDP recommendations as an additional independent variable, initially in a linear form only 22 , to see if these recommendations have explanatory power over and above the more usual determinants of discretionary fiscal policy. Our model to be estimated reads:
Here, ∆BBS x i,t is the change in the structural budget balance for country i between year t and year t−1, as reported in forecast vintage x. OG x i,t is the (expected) output gap for country i year t. BB x i,t−1 and DBT x i,t−1 are the country i, year t − 1 budget balance and debt level as reported in forecast vintage x, with x running from SF : t − 1 to AF : t + 1. elec i,t is a dummy variable equal to one if there is a planned election and zero otherwise, included to capture potential political business cycle effects. REC x i,t is the country i, time t EDP recommendation as known at the time of the forecast. crisis t is a dummy equal to 1 if the year under consideration is 2008 or 2009, and zero otherwise, capturing the rapid and unexpected fiscal deterioration during those years. Finally, ESM i,t is a dummy indicating whether countries received some form of financial support during the crisis, as these countries typically went through deep recessions and potential output figures (and thereby the structural budget balance) were revised substantially. On top of this, financial support programs generally came with large EDP recommendations, that differed in some aspects from 'regular' recommendations (see section 4.2). As starting point, to test the overall effectiveness of EDP recommendations, we assume homogeneous effects of all EDP recommendations. We will relax this assumption in section 4.2.
Since the output gap is potentially endogenously affected by fiscal policy, we apply a 2SLS approach, instrumenting the output gap with its own lag and the trade-weighted output gap of the other EU member states. Standard errors are clustered at the country level, allowing for heteroskedasticity and within-country autocorrelation of unknown form. We estimate our model for a panel of EMU member states over the period 1999-2017. Countries enter the panel as they join EMU. 23 We carry out regressions for six vintages in total. Four of these equations focus on projections, namely the projected change in the structural budget balance in the current year and one year ahead Spring and Autumn Forecasts. The remaining two concern realized data. This allows us to track, first of all, at what moment in time countries start to promise to live up to the fiscal rules, if at all. Secondly, we can see whether the recommendations were actually followed up in reality, rather than only in projections.
If EDP recommendations have any explanatory power in the above regression, this provides initial evidence that they are effective. However, the interpretation of such a result could to some extent be problematic. Any country with a deficit exceeding 3% of GDP is almost by definition in an EDP, effectively leaving us no control group. If high-deficit countries respond more fiercely to changes in their budget balance for reasons other than EDP recommendations, this could be picked up by our EDP variable, inflating the estimated coefficient.
We pursue several routes to avoid such a bias. Firstly, we relax our assumption of a homogeneous response to EDP recommendations. More specifically, the effect of recommendations is allowed to differ between countries in financial support programs and countries that are not.
Secondly, since EDP recommendations may take aboard more (recent) information than captured by our other variables, we include interest rate spreads vis-à-vis Germany to control for market pressure. Thirdly, and most fundamentally, to account for any other reasons that deficits above 3% of GDP might induce a change in fiscal behavior, we allow for a different response to deficits above 3%. In all vintages, the output gap has a positive and significant effect on the structural budget balance. That is, holding constant all other factors, we find that the discretionary fiscal policy functions countercyclically. The effect is limited in size (a one percentage point worsening of the output gap, leads to a fiscal loosening of 0.1 -0.2 pp). In contrast to findings by Cimadomo (2012), the countercyclical effect is also present in realization data. A possible explanation is the coordinated fiscal stimulus in 2009/10, which is not included in Cimadomo's dataset.
Results

First results
Concerning the other control variables, the effect of the lagged level of the budget balance is only significant in two vintages, with a higher deficit (marginally) inducing fiscal consolidation.
The lagged debt level is only significant in one vintage, in which it has the 'wrong' negative sign. Overall, the evidence that discretionary fiscal policy making in the euro area contributes to maintaining solvency is weak. We do find some evidence of political business cycles. In the regressions using realization data, (planned) elections induce a statistically significant fiscal loosening of about 0.5% of GDP. In the forecast vintages, this effect is not visible. 1999-2016 1999-2016 2001-2017 2000-2017 2002-2017 2001-2017 Hansen 1999-2016 1999-2016 2001-2017 2000-2017 2002-2017 2001-2017 Hansen 
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conditions agreed upon in the MoU also being transposed into EDP recommendations.
The character of fiscal (EDP) recommendations deriving from MoUs differs in multiple ways from other EDP recommendations. Monitoring is tighter, the potential consequences of disobeying with the recommendation are more severe, as this could lead to a suspension of financial assistance, and the requested fiscal adjustment is typically relatively large. 25 Moreover, the generally very dire economic situation in the countries receiving financial support potentially also affects the (observed) implementation of EDP recommendations. It is arguably more difficult to implement consolidation measures in times of a deep recession. 26
Also, most of the countries receiving support suffered from large revisions to potential output, which renders our measure of fiscal adjustment less reliable.
As a result of the above factors, the coefficient on the effect of EDP recommendations could reflect the particular policy response in countries in financial dire straits, and as a consequence might inadequately reflect the behavior of countries monitored under the lighter, usual EDPregime.
To investigate in what way financial support programs drive or influence our results, we interact our dummy for financial support programs with the EDP recommendations.
The augmented regression shows that the results in table 1 indeed do not carry over to countries receiving financial support. For these countries, fiscal adjustment does not seem to correlate with the size of EDP recommendations (table 2) . However, the coefficient on the financial support dummy itself is large and significant in most vintages. Taken at face value, this implies that countries receiving financial support did deliver substantial fiscal consolidation, but that the amount was relatively disconnected from the exact adjustment demanded.
For countries that did not receive financial support, the picture also changes. We now find evidence that these countries actually did implement fiscal measures when asked to do so. Compared to current year Spring Forecasts, the coefficient on EDP recommendations falls somewhat in later vintages, but it remains highly significant. From this table, the conclusion would be that EDP recommendations do affect fiscal policy in the direction desired by the EC.
Controlling for market pressure
So far, fiscal sustainability concerns are modeled by the lagged deficit and debt level. However, these measures are only available at a low frequency, while market concerns with regard to fiscal sustainability can change swiftly. Moreover, deficit and debt figures do not account for various other factors that affect a government's liquidity or solvency position, such as the maturity structure of the debt and the potential future tax base.
Interest spreads vis-à-vis a safe country provide a comprehensive and timely measure of fiscal sustainability as perceived by market participants. Governments might therefore be more responsive to changes in spreads than to slow-moving indicators such as the debt level, as 25 On average, the initially recommended annual adjustment for countries in a financial support program amounted to 1.21% of GDP, versus 0.85% of GDP for other countries. However, the fiscal targets for countries in support programs have often been revised downward in updates of the programs. The difference in required annual fiscal adjustment is therefore smaller in final recommendations: 1.01% of GDP versus 0.81% of GDP. 26 Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) were among the first to find significantly larger fiscal multipliers in recessions, which also makes it more difficult to improve the budget balance through consolidation.
suggested by Dell'Erba et al. (2015) and Debrun and Kinda (2015) . If in drawing up EDP recommendations the EC takes into account similar factors as market participants do, EDP recommendations might be closely related to movements in interest spreads. Diaz Kalan et al.
(2018) find that EDP recommendations and market pressure indeed correlate positively. This could imply that our EDP variable -at least partly -captures the effect of market pressure.
We therefore additionally control for market pressure in our regressions. We do this by including twelve month changes in the ten year sovereign yield spread vis-à-vis Germany as a regressor. To avoid fiscal actions having an effect on the spreads, and taking into account the lead time in producing forecasts, we apply a cut-off date about three months in advance of the publication date in case of one year ahead forecasts. For current year and realization vintages, we use the change in the spread in the year preceding the year under consideration.
Changes in interest spreads have the expected effect. In four out of six regressions, including the realized data, an increase in spreads significantly induces fiscal adjustment. Market discipline thus seems to play a role in EMU, even though the coefficients are small in economic terms. The effect of including interest spreads on the other estimated coefficients is minimal. In particular, the coefficient and standard errors of EDP recommendations remain virtually unchanged.
Kink in the fiscal reaction function
According to the rules of the SGP, EU countries with projected or actual budget deficits exceeding 3% of GDP in principle end up in an EDP. Likewise, countries with a deficit smaller than 3% of GDP will usually not be in an EDP. This implies that high deficits and the presence of EDP recommendations almost by definition coincide. If, for other reasons than mentioned before, countries respond more strongly to developments in their budget balance as soon as deficits reach critical levels, this non-linearity in the fiscal reaction function could in our specification be picked up by our EDP variable. We therefore construct a real-time dummy variable equal to one for (projected) deficits exceeding 3% of GDP, and zero otherwise. We include this dummy in our regression and interact it with the lagged level of the budget balance.
As it turns out, for countries with budget deficits below 3% of GDP we now find a stronger and more significant response to past deficits (table 4) . A lower budget balance is found to induce an improvement in the structural budget balance in most vintages. The interaction with high deficits, however, has the opposite sign and is significant in the realization vintages. Overall, the response of the structural budget balance to deficits larger than 3% of GDP is more muted than the response to smaller deficits.
In contrast to findings by and Cimadomo (2012) , the dummy for high deficits itself does not have a significant effect in any of the vintages. This underlines that our EDP variable is a more accurate measure of the incentives provided by the SGP than the dummy. Indeed, compared to the previous specifications, our findings on the effectiveness of EDP recommendations are by and large unchanged. We still observe a substantial significant positive effect of EDP recommendations on planned and actual fiscal adjustment. 1999-2016 1999-2016 2001-2017 2000-2017 2002-2017 2001-2017 Hansen-J 0.338 0.371 0.863 0.722 0.886 0.471
The dependent variable is the year t change in the structural budget balance. The top row indicates the forecast vintage. Independent variables are measured in real-time; superscripts are omitted for the sake of readability. Regressions include country fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robustness
Controlling for the regular determinants of discretionary fiscal policy and various factors potentially coinciding with high deficits, we consistently find that EDP recommendations affect both projected and actual fiscal adjustments. We test the sensitivity of this result, as displayed in table 4, to a range of specification and sampling choices.
Sample selection
Between 2007 and 2016 seven countries acceded the euro area. As a consequence, we have an unbalanced panel with only few observations for some countries. We therefore re-estimate our model on a panel comprising just the twelve founders of the euro. Table A .2 reports the -largely unchanged -results. The coefficient on EDP recommendations slightly increases.
Due to gaps in some forecast vintages, the sample size differs per vintage. To make sure that this does not drive the differences in results between vintages, we rerun the regressions with a 1999-2016 1999-2016 2001-2017 2000-2017 2002-2017 2001-2017 Hansen suggests that fiscal policy has been more countercyclical following idiosyncratic shocks than following common shocks. This fits with the idea that the common monetary policy is there to respond to common shocks, while fiscal policy is best suited to respond to national shocks.
Not all EDP recommendations are defined in terms of the cyclically adjusted or structural budget balance. For some of the ESM countries, targets haves at times been set in terms of the nominal budget balance. We converted the requested improvement in the budget balance into structural adjustment using equation 2. This conversion might have induced measurement error. Moreover, it is possible that the nature of the recommendations defined in actual terms differs from those defined in structural terms. 27 In table A.9, we therefore exclude all such recommendations. Our earlier findings are confirmed, with the link between requested and delivered fiscal adjustment somewhat strengthening for ESM countries. 27 In the case of Greece it has for instance occurred that disappointing GDP growth caused it to miss its nominal targets, so that further adjustment was needed, even though in structural terms Greece had more than delivered. In our regressions this could lead to a coefficient larger than one in some of the vintages.
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Size of the recommendation
According to hypothesis 3, the fraction of the recommendation that is implemented is highest for 'medium-sized' recommendations. A small recommendation will not invoke any reaction, since the government realizes it will not be punished for minor deviations. Once government effort is sparked, the response is relatively strong, as minor increases in fiscal adjustment strongly reduce the probability of being sanctioned. For large recommendations, the demanded deviation from the preferred fiscal policy becomes politically costly, with sanctions not increasing proportionally.
To allow for these two inflexion points in the government's response, we include squares and cubes of EDP recommendations as additional regressors. figure 4b ), but the nonlinear terms lose much of their explanatory power (table A.11).
28 To this end, we exclude negatively signed recommendations from the sample.
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From the moment the broad outlines of the European fiscal framework began to take shape, the framework has been the subject of frequent debate. Criticism of the SGP comes both from those who abhor the particular form or even existence of fiscal rules in the EMU and from those who support the rules in themselves, but question their effectiveness. Remarkably, direct evidence on the effectiveness of the procedures laid down in the SGP was so far largely absent.
In this paper, we fill this gap by analyzing the effect of EDP recommendations on national fiscal policy. We estimate real-time fiscal reaction functions, including EDP recommendations and a series of control variables. The real-time nature of our analysis aligns with the information set of policy makers at subsequent moments in time. Taken at face value, our results imply that an EDP recommendation to improve the budget balance by 1% of GDP, induces countries to take consolidation measures of about 0.8% of GDP. For countries receiving financial assistance, such a relation cannot be established. Our results confirm, and expand on, the more reducedform evidence provided on the effects of the 3%-threshold by Caselli and Wingender (2018) , Cimadomo (2012) . We finally provide suggestive evidence that 'medium-sized' recommendations are lived up to best. All in all, although identifying purely causal effects in a relatively small macro-panel is difficult, we believe that we can argue with confidence that EDP recommendations affect fiscal behavior.
In interpreting the size of the effects, some nuance remains warranted. First, even absent any EDP recommendation, most governments would -at least to some extent -eventually correct large deficits. As such, the effect of EDP recommendations may partly reflect a forward shift of fiscal adjustment rather than an additional effect. Second, EDP recommendations may be tailored to countries' own plans. This risk is most evident for revisions of recommendations, which could be driven by looming non-compliance and which we therefore exclude in a robustness check. Initial recommendations should be less sensitive to endogeneity, as they generally cover a multi-year period. However, to the extent that they still represent a compromise between governments and the EC, even full compliance with the EDP recommendations could represent a smaller improvement of the budget balance than deemed desirable by the EC.
Overall, our findings suggest that, with a large majority of member states subject to an EDP for multiple years in the post-2009 period, the SGP has in recent years, for better or worse, been an important driver of the fiscal stance in the euro area. Inherently, this had procyclical effects.
An important element to counteract procyclicality is the preventive arm of the SGP, which aims to create a safety margin to the 3% threshold in good times, so as to allow automatic stabilizers to function in times of recession. The preventive arm has been amended significantly in 2011, the effectiveness of which is an important topic for future research.
A Annex
A.1 Model
The government's optimization problem can be split in two parts. Depending on its choice of BBS r , the probability of a sanction is 0, γ 2 (1 − ∆BBS r +c REC ) 2 , or 1. We first compute the government's optimal response to an EDP recommendation given the regime in place. Then,
given that the regime in place itself depends on the government's policy, we select the optimal regime for all values of REC.
Conditional on ∆BBS r ≥ REC − c, the probability of a sanction is 0. Minimization of the loss function w.r.t. to both ∆BBS and ∆BBS r shows that in this case the optimal actual and reported fiscal adjustment are equal to the government's preferred fiscal adjustment:
For any ∆BBS r + c < 0, the probability of a sanction is fixed as well, this time at 1. Given that a sanction is unavoidable, the government would again stick to its preferred fiscal policy, without any attempts to cover up its deficit:
Having covered the corner solutions, the most relevant regime is the intermediate one. For 0−c ≤ ∆BBS r ≤ REC −c, the probability of a sanction increases nonlinearly in the deviation of reported fiscal adjustment from the required one, and is given by γ 2 (1− ∆BBS r +c REC ) 2 . Minimization of the loss function 1 shows that the reported adjustment is given by:
and actual fiscal adjustment by:
Equation 7 shows that the actual fiscal adjustment is a weighted average of the preferred fiscal adjustment in a situation without supranational rules and the reported consolidation.
By substituting equation 6 in equation 7, we can obtain the optimal levels of actual and reported fiscal adjustment from the government's perspective. period 1999-2016 1999-2016 2001-2017 2000-2017 2002-2017 2001-2017 Hansen-J 0.928 0.823 0.197 0.570 0.882 0.822
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A.2 Tables
The dependent variable is the year t change in the structural budget balance. The top row indicates the forecast vintage. Independent variables are measured in real-time; superscripts are omitted for the sake of readability. Regressions include country fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 2002-2016 2002-2016 2002-2016 2002-2016 2002-2016 2002-2016 Hansen-J 0.229 0.287 0.933 0.973 0.749 0.789
The dependent variable is the year t change in the structural budget balance. The top row indicates the forecast vintage. Independent variables are measured in real-time; superscripts are omitted for the sake of readability. Regressions include country fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. period 1999-2016 1999-2016 2001-2017 2000-2017 2002-2017 2001-2017 Hansen-J 0.378 0.181 0.859 0.035 0.264 0.040
The dependent variable is the year t change in the structural budget balance. The top row indicates the forecast vintage. Independent variables are measured in real-time; superscripts are omitted for the sake of readability. Regressions include country fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 1999-2016 1999-2016 2001-2017 2000-2017 2002-2017 2001-2017 Hansen-J 0.884 0.142 0.349 0.368 0.937 0.220
The dependent variable is the year t change in the structural budget balance. The top row indicates the forecast vintage. Independent variables are measured in real-time; superscripts are omitted for the sake of readability. Regressions include country fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 1999-2016 1999-2016 2001-2017 2000-2017 2002-2017 2001-2017 Hansen 1999-2016 1999-2016 2001-2017 2000-2017 2002-2017 2001-2017 Hansen-J 0.173 0.116 0.577 0.479 0.984 0.438
The dependent variable is the year t change in the structural budget balance. The variable EDP rec. only includes the initial recommendation for any given year. The top row indicates the forecast vintage. Independent variables are measured in real-time; superscripts are omitted for the sake of readability. Regressions include country fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 1999-2016 1999-2016 2001-2017 2000-2017 2002-2017 2001-2017 Hansen-J 0.182 0.656 0.502 0.218 0.338 0.174
The dependent variable is the year t change in the structural budget balance. The top row indicates the forecast vintage. Independent variables are measured in real-time; superscripts are omitted for the sake of readability. Regressions include country fixed effects and a full set of year dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 1999-2016 1999-2016 2001-2017 2000-2017 2002-2017 2001-2017 Hansen-J 0.189 0.102 0.779 0.514 0.916 0.677
The dependent variable is the year t change in the structural budget balance. The top row indicates the forecast vintage. Independent variables are measured in real-time; superscripts are omitted for the sake of readability. Regressions include country fixed effects. Observations in which a country received an EDP recommendation defined in terms of the nominal budget balance are excluded from the regression. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 1999-2016 1999-2016 2001-2017 2000-2017 2002-2017 2001-2017 Hansen-J 0.319 0.432 0.787 0.748 0.735 0.584
The dependent variable is the year t change in the structural budget balance. The top row indicates the forecast vintage. Independent variables are measured in real-time; superscripts are omitted for the sake of readability. Regressions include country fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
AF: t+1 SF: t+1 AF: t SF: t AF: t-1 SF: t-1
Output gapi,t 0.17*** 0.26*** 0.37*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.11** (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) Budget bali,t−1 -0.09** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.01 (0 1999-2016 1999-2016 2001-2017 2000-2017 2002-2017 2001-2017 Hansen-J 0.189 0.107 0.828 0.225 0.313 0.697
